The use of kairos in Renaissance political philosophy by Paul, Joanne
 1 
The Use of Kairos in Renaissance Political Philosophy* 
by JOANNE PAUL 
Although the Greek concept of kairos (καιρός) has undergone a recent renewal of interest among 
scholars of Renaissance rhetoric, this revival has not yet been paralleled by its reception into the history 
of political thought. This article examines the meanings and uses of this important concept within the 
ancient Greek tradition, particularly in the works of Isocrates and Plutarch, in order to understand how 
it is employed by two of the most important political thinkers of the sixteenth century: Thomas Elyot 
and Niccolò Machiavelli. Through such an investigation this paper argues that an appreciation of the 
concept of kairos and its use by Renaissance political writers provides a fuller understanding of the 
political philosophy of the period. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The ancient Greek concept of kairos (καιρός) has recently undergone a revival of interest among 
historians of rhetoric.1 These scholars detail the importance that ancient writers placed on the concept of 
kairos as denoting both a sense of “adaptation and accommodation to convention” and, conversely, “the 
uniquely timely, the spontaneous, the radically particular.”2 They point to the prevalence of the first 
sense, often captured in the Latin concept of decorum, from the time of Cicero (106–43 BCE) onward, 
and especially in the Renaissance. Although involving the same understanding of adaptation to 
circumstance as kairos, decorum was highly moral — synthesizing the ends of utile and honestum in 
any given action — whereas kairos carried connotations of moral flexibility, even moral relativism. It is 
the moralized decorum that dominated much of medieval and Renaissance rhetoric, and has held the 
attention of historians of the period ever since. In the words of James Kinneavy, the pioneering scholar 
on kairos in the Anglophone tradition, “although the Ciceronian notion of propriety persisted 
throughout the medieval and Renaissance period, the residual influence of kairos is almost a negligible 
chapter in the history of rhetoric since antiquity.”3 Although work has been done in recent decades to 
counter this view, the revival of the study of kairos in rhetoric has not yet been paralleled by its 
reception into the history of political thought.4  
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As recent scholarship has shown, an understanding of the various elements in the classical ars 
rhetorica greatly illuminates a reading of political texts, especially in the Renaissance.5 Kairos as a 
rhetorical theory — an understanding of how, and more importantly, when to speak in a given context 
— thus has a fundamental role to play in Renaissance political philosophy, especially given its 
preoccupation with questions of political counsel.6 This paper will begin by focusing on the use of the 
kairotic tradition by one of England’s leading humanists of the sixteenth century, Thomas Elyot (ca. 
1490–1546), in his 1533 Pasquil the Playne, a dialogue on the problem of giving appropriate political 
advice. In Pasquil, Elyot deliberately recalls the Greek tradition of kairos, and designates the ability to 
adopt an understanding of kairotic speech as the key talent of the effective political adviser.  
As kairos is essential to rhetoric, and rhetoric essential to Renaissance political philosophy, 
kairos ought to form an important part of an evaluation of the period’s political thought. The political 
influence of kairos, however, does not end with well-timed political speech, for kairos also sets out a 
model of political action, both for Greek and for Renaissance writers. This theory is best explored in one 
of the sixteenth century’s most influential political theorists, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527). In The 
Prince, written in 1513 and published posthumously in 1532, Machiavelli emphasizes the importance of a 
knowledge of occasione to his prince, without which his virtù will go to waste. This concept of occasione 
bears clear relation to that of kairos in the Greek tradition, a fact recognized by commentators in the 
decades that followed as they further developed a political theory founded on the concept of kairos.  
In order to understand Elyot’s and Machiavelli’s use of kairos, this paper starts with an account 
of the history of the concept, including its etymology and earliest uses in Sophistic and Platonic 
philosophy, before moving on to its place in the works of two of the most prominent Greek 
philosophers of kairos, Isocrates (436–338 BCE) and Plutarch (ca. 46–120 CE).7 Analyzing kairos in 
political speech and political action separately, the influence of the Greek tradition is shown first in 
Elyot’s Pasquil, before moving on to an examination of the ways in which Machiavelli too draws directly 
on the philosophies of Isocrates and Plutarch, especially regarding the lessons of seizing opportunity, of 
necessity, of moral flexibility, and the study of comparable historical moments. Finally, this paper ends 
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by gesturing toward the political tradition of kairos in the works of late sixteenth-century thinkers, 
especially those associated with the spread of Machiavellianism and reason of state. By grasping the 
complex history of kairos in the classical (and especially Greek) works embraced in the Renaissance, a 
political theory of kairos emerges that is fundamental to a fuller understanding of Renaissance political 
thought.  
2. ETYMOLOGY AND USES OF KAIROS 
The word kairos has its roots in archery, where it denoted a “penetrable opening, an aperture” through 
which Greek archers aimed, simulating the forest of shields and armor through which an arrow must 
pass to reach its target.8 This origin explains the many meanings of kairos, such as mark and target, 
both literally, as in the Iliad where it indicates a place on the body to strike fatally,9 and figuratively, 
such as in Sophocles’s Electra, in which Orestes urges “Listen closely to my words and correct me, if I 
miss the mark in any way.”10 The development of kairos from this source explains its dual meaning as an 
opening or opportunity and as due measure, for the shot requires not only accuracy, but also the right 
amount of power — neither too much nor too little — in order to pass successfully through the 
opening.11  
In general, kairos carried a temporal connotation and has a complex relationship with the other 
Greek word for time, chronos (χρόνος).12 Whereas chronos denotes a linear and progressive sense of 
time, kairos stands in opposition as a rare singularity.13 One of its standard uses is thus to describe the 
character of a segment of time, translatable even as when or while. It is from this use that kairos comes 
to signify season or the times — for example in Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War (431 
BCE), where he notes that it was “at this crisis” that “Pisander and his colleagues” arrived into Athens. 14  
For many thinkers, this use of kairos took on an ethical dimension as well. If one accepts kairos 
as a deviation from linear and universal time, any expectation that one must match speech or actions to 
the character of the times presents problems for universal or absolute moral systems. It is no surprise, 
then, that from the early centuries of Greek philosophy, the concept of kairos was linked to moral 
relativism, especially that of the Sophists of the fifth century BCE: Pythagoras, Protagoras, and Gorgias.15 
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For such thinkers, kairos had the power of determining the moral value of human actions: something 
may be good or bad, honorable or dishonorable, based on its accordance with that particular moment.16 
For example, Gorgias in his Epitaphios praises those men who “preferred . . . many times the correctness 
of words to strict law, because they believed this to be the most divine and universal law: to say and not 
to say and to do and not to do the right thing at the right time.”17 A similar lesson is expressed by the 
anonymous Sophist treatise Dissoi logoi: “‘there is nothing that is in every respect seemly or shameful, 
but kairos takes the same things and makes them shameful and then changes them round and makes 
them seemly.’”18  
Much of what is known of Sophistic thought, especially regarding kairotic moral flexibility, 
comes, as it did to Renaissance writers, through the works of anti-Sophists such as Plato.19 Plato was 
concerned to provide an alternative to the moral relativism of the Sophists, often aligning his character 
of Socrates against Sophistic straw men. He did, however, confront them on (or rather in) their own 
terms, that is, by providing a definition of kairos. For Plato, kairos undergirds the understanding of 
virtue as the universal golden mean between two extremes — a doctrine embraced by both Aristotle 
and Cicero, as well as (through such sources) philosophers of the medieval and Renaissance periods.20 
Kairos also played a crucial role in Plato’s rhetorical and political philosophy. For instance, his 
construction of the ideal statesman in the Politikos is built upon a notion of kairos: “For what is really 
kingship must not itself perform practical tasks but control those with the capacity to perform them, 
because it knows when it is the right time to begin and set in motion the most important things in 
cities and when it is the wrong time.”21 Plato, in the Politikos, gives his statesman the essential skill he 
had assigned to the rhetorician in his Phaedrus. In this latter text, Plato’s Socrates details the qualities of 
the ideal orator, noting that only once he has “added thereto a knowledge of the times for speaking and 
for keeping silence, and has also distinguished the favourable occasions for brief speech or pitiful speech 
or intensity” will his art be complete.22  
3. KAIROS AND RHETORIC IN ISOCRATES AND PLUTARCH 
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Isocrates, a student of the Sophists and contemporary of Plato, and Plutarch, writing in the Second 
Sophistic, were particularly preoccupied with the questions of when to speak or to stay silent, and when 
certain topics should be broached, based on a consideration of kairos. In Against the Sophists, Isocrates 
outlines a similar set of skills for the rhetorician as Plato had, adding that oratory especially requires 
“fitness for the occasion, propriety of style, and originality.”23 It remains, however, unclear how one is to 
determine what is fit for the occasion: when one should speak, and when silence is to be preferred. For 
Isocrates, there are only “two occasions for speech — when the subject is one which you thoroughly 
know and when it is one on which you are compelled to speak.”24 It is “on these occasions alone [that] 
speech [is] better than silence; on all others, it is better to be silent than to speak.”25 However, of what 
this compulsion consists Isocrates is unclear; he does not, for example, tell his listeners whether a 
counselor ought to feel compelled to speak the truth to his king.  
Plutarch gives a fuller treatment of these issues than Isocrates, divisible into two interrelated 
themes: the correct timing-propriety for specific topics and the timing-propriety of frank speech 
(παρρησία, parrhesia).26 He too emphasizes the importance of the orator’s knowledge of kairos, for 
“occasions arise quickly and often bring with them in public affairs sudden developments,” which 
explains why “Demosthenes [as an orator] was inferior to many, as they say, because he drew back and 
hesitated when the occasion called for the opposite course.”27 On the other hand, “the man who is so 
moved by the events which take place and the opportunities which offer themselves that he springs to 
his feet is the one who most thrills the crowd, attracts it, and carries it with him.”28 Thus it is that “he 
who knows how, knows also when to speak.”29 
Plutarch’s views on kairos can be found in his Quaestiones Convivales (Table Talk), in which he 
asks “Whether midst our cups it is fit to talk learnedly and philosophize?”30 The figure of Plutarch 
begins by recalling Isocrates’s discussion of kairos: “Isocrates the rhetorician, when at a drinking bout 
some begged him to make a speech, only returned: With those things in which I have no skill the time 
doth not suit; and in those things with which the time suits, I have no skill.”31 The character of Crato 
agrees in principle with Isocrates’s statement, “if he designed to make such long-winded discourses as 
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would have spoiled all mirth and conversation,” but suggests that it is possible to introduce at this time 
speech that serves to “regulate and adjust . . . our gay humours and our pleasures, to proportion the 
time and keep them from excess.”32 The discussants agree that “topics fit to be used at table” are those 
stories and examples “fitted to . . . the juncture of affairs,” which “instruct . . . with persuasive and 
smooth arguments.”33 Thus they conclude that it “become[s] a philosopher to enquire which is the 
convenient and proper time” for all things.34 
It is Plutarch’s treatment of parrhesia and kairos, however, that had the greatest impact on 
discussions of political counsel in the Renaissance, particularly his observations in Quomodo adulator ab 
amico internoscatur (How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend).35 Plutarch employs kairos repeatedly 
throughout this text, marking its importance for those wishing to give truthful and virtuous advice for 
the honor and profit of the hearer. This is in contrast to the flatterer, whose speech is directed at the 
pleasure of the hearer and who has no notion of kairos at all. The flatterer, Plutarch suggests, “sheweth 
himself alwaies jocund, mery and delightsome, without crossing at any time.”36 By contrast, a true friend 
is willing to give admonishment as well as praise, so long as “it be done in time and place convenient.”37 
Discussing parrhesia, Plutarch notes that “this libertie of speech where of I speake, is the nature 
of a medicine, which if it be not given in time convenient and as it ought to be, besides, that it doth no 
good at all, it troubleth the body, worketh greevance, and in stead of a remedie prooveth to be a 
mischiefe.”38 Without kairos, frank counsel is no better than flattery, and in fact may even be worse, for 
“fit opportunity overslipt and neglected doth much hurt.”39 On the other hand, “a faithfull and carefull 
friend” will not “reject such occasions,” but will “take hold thereof quickly, and make good use of 
them.”40 Such moments “open the doore and make way for us to enter, and give us leave to speak 
frankly.”41 In short, “opportunitie a wise and skilfull friend will not omit, but make especial good use 
of.”42 
He repeats the lessons of Quaestiones Convivales, writing that “we must take heed how we 
speake broad at a table where friends be met together to drinke wine liberally and to make good cheere: 
for he that amid pleasant discourses and mery talke mooveth a speech that causeth bending and knitting 
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of browes” causes great disruption and even risk, for “this neglect of opportunitie bringeth with it great 
danger.”43 Given this hazard, Plutarch addresses the following questions: “In what cases and occurrences 
then, ought a friend to be earnest and vehement? and when is he to use his libertie of speech, and 
extend it to the full?”44 In other words, Plutarch seeks to determine what it is exactly that makes counsel 
kairotic and thus justifies free speech. The answer combines the virtuous ends of counsel with a 
consideration of kairos. One should give frank counsel “when occasion is offered, and the time serveth 
best to represse excessive pleasure, to restraine unbridled choler, to refraine intollerable pride and 
insolencie, to stay insatiable avarice, or to stand against any foolish habitude and inconsiderate 
motion.”45 Kairos exists in the opportunity to encourage virtuous action and bridle vice. For Plutarch this 
“define[s] . . . the opportunity of free speech.”46 
4. KAIROS AND THE COUNSELOR IN ELYOT’S PASQUIL 
One cannot separate the treatment of kairos in Isocrates or Plutarch from the consideration of 
“oportunitie & tyme” in Thomas Elyot’s Pasquil the Playne.47 Elyot translated Plutarch’s De liberis 
educandis in 1530, and it has been suggested that he also produced a translation of Plutarch’s Quomodo 
adulator ab amico internoscatur for Henry VIII.48 In the same year that Elyot published Pasquil, he also 
published a translation of Isocrates’s Ad Nicoclem, a work of political advice to the Cyprian king 
Nicocles in which Isocrates notes that the crucial virtue of a counselor is the ability to speak in 
accordance with kairos. In Elyot’s words: “specyally they that be counsailors ought to haue consideration 
of the occasyon, tyme, and opportunyte.”49  
This idea is played out in Pasquil. Pasquil is a dialogue between three counselors on the best 
method of giving advice to their prince. The title character must defend his frank speech against two 
other figures: Gnatho, who argues that flattery is the best way to counsel a king, and Harpocrates, who 
favors silent acquiescence. Gnatho chides Pasquil for “raylyng” on without considering “what, and to 
whome, and where thou spekest.”50 He suggests that Pasquil’s “libertie in speche” is “vnprofitable” as 
“nothing that thou blamist, is of one iote amended, and thou losest therby preferment” as well as 
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wasting time.51 This argument is based upon his interpretation of “Aeschylus counsaylle,” given in 
Pasquil as “holding thy thonge wher it behoueth the. And spekyng in tyme that which is conuenient.”52 
The line quoted is from the second play of Aeschylus’s Oresteia, The Libation Bearers. The 
character of Orestes addresses the chorus, instructing them to “keep silent in places where there is need 
and speak that which is in the right place.”53 Elyot’s work in Pasquil is cut out for him, as neither the 
“places where there is need” to keep silent nor “that which is in the right place” to speak, are defined. 
Like Plutarch, Elyot seeks to identify exactly what constitutes kairotic counsel, and so the rest of the 
dialogue concerns the proper interpretation of this line from Aeschylus — in other words, the proper 
interpretation of kairos. 
Gnatho gives his reading first. He interprets the statement as meaning that “it behoueth a man 
to holde his tunge, whan he aforeseeth by any experience, that the thinge, whiche he wolde purpose or 
speke of to his superior, shall neyther be pleasantly herde nor thankefully taken.”54 He suggests that, 
when it comes to words, “oportunitie & tyme alwaye do depende on the affection and appetite of hym 
that hereth them.”55 Of course, anyone well read in their Plutarch, as Elyot was, would know that this 
was an interpretation of kairos completely at odds with the one that a good counselor was meant to 
adopt. 
In response, Elyot has Pasquil reiterate much of the Plutarchan doctrine of kairos explored 
above. He begins with examples drawn from Plutarch’s discussion of table talk: “When men be set at a 
good soupper, and be busily occupyed in eatynge and drinkinge, though thou be depely sene in 
philosophie, holde thy tonge and dispute not of temperaunce.”56 This is juxtaposed with a more formal 
council setting: “Whan thou arte sittynge in counsaile aboute maters of weighty importaunce: talke not 
than of passe tyme or daliaunce, but omittinge affection or dreede, speke than to the pourpose.”57 If one 
takes account of the proper occasion, Pasquil tells Gnatho, then the counsel will be even more effective. 
For example, “Whan thy frendes be set downe to souper, before the cuppes betwise fylled: reherce the 
peryll and also dishonesti that hapneth by glotony.”58 When it comes to councils, the right time comes 
“after thou haste either herde one raisonne bifore the, or at the leest weye, in the balaunce of thyne 
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owne raison ponderid the questio[n].”59 It is then that one should “spare not to shew thine aduise, & to 
speke truely.”60  
Pasquil then proceeds to give Gnatho a full definition of the classical concept of kairos: 
“Oportunite consisteth in place or tyme, where and whan the sayd affections or passion of wrath be 
mitigate and out of extremitie. And wordes be called conueniente, whiche haue respecte to the nature 
and state of the person, vnto whom they be spoken, and also to the detrimente, whiche mought ensue 
by the vice or lacke that thou hast espied, & it ought not to be as thou hast supposed. For oportunite & 
tyme for a counsayllour to speke, do not depend of the affection and appetite of hym that is counsayled: 
mary than counsaylle were but a vayne worde, and euery man wolde do as hym lyste.”61 As Plutarch had 
established, the affections should not be entered into a consideration of opportunity; in fact, the 
opportune time is when they are “out of extremitie.” Rather one should only consider those things that 
will ensure that truthful and virtuous counsel will be most efficacious. 
Pasquil and the third member of the dialogue, Harpocrates, also enter into a consideration of 
kairos and counsel. Hearing that his master will “syt in counsail about waightie causes” after dining, 
Harpocrates declares that only after he too has dined will he give attendance.62 This prompts in Pasquil 
a diatribe against the reversals of the world, which cause men to counsel after the day is done, instead 
of attending to such matters first thing in the morning.63 He reflects that “after noone is tourned to fore 
noone, vertue into vice.”64 This discussion of the importance of the timing of pleasurable pursuits 
(namely dinner) and counsel, following closely on the heels of Pasquil’s previous examples that 
juxtaposed the same, recalls the reader to a consideration of the importance of the opportune time to 
counsel, especially as regards the definition of virtue and vice. 
These themes are continued in the ensuing debate. Challenging Harpocrates’s dedication to 
silence, Pasquil asks him, “If I perceyued one at thy backe with a swerde drawne, redy to strike the, 
woldest thou that I shulde holde my peace, or else tell the?”65 Harpocrates responds that “naye, sylence 
were than oute of season.”66 The proper season for speech was a rendering of kairos employed by 
English translators, and Plutarch himself had criticized those who employ “hurtfull and unholesome 
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sauces” to “season their free language.”67 Pasquil does the same, and responds that Harpocrates “wyll 
season silence,” joking that “marye I wene my lorde shulde haue a better cooke of you thanne a 
counsayllour.”68 He asks Harpocrates, “Howe thou doest season thy sylence[?]”69 Harpocrates responds 
that he does so “with sugar, for I vse lyttell salte,” and Pasquil retorts that this “maketh your counsayl 
more swete than sauery.”70 
Harpocrates’s seasoning of his silence with sugar, Pasquil suggests, makes it more appealing to 
the pleasurable appetites of his master, but less wholesome. The timing or season of his counsel alone 
changes its direction from virtuous ends to serving only the passions. Harpocrates concedes this point 
and so Pasquil asks him again, “Whan is your silence in season?”71 Harpocrates admits that he “can not 
shortly tel” for he is “so abashed” by the “froward reson” of Pasquil.72 Pasquil comes to an end by 
encouraging his listeners to “beare away the sayde sentence [of Aesychlus] with myne exposition, and 
vse it” — in other words, to take away his interpretation of kairos and apply it to their counsel.73 
5. KAIROS AND POLITICAL ACTION IN ISOCRATES AND PLUTARCH 
As mentioned above, it is in Isocrates’s Ad Nicoclem that he sets out kairotic timing as an essential 
attribute of a political counselor. This text also draws attention to a knowledge of kairos as crucial to 
the king himself, positing a theory of kairos distinct from that of rhetoric alone, and concerned with 
political action as well. Isocrates tells Nicocles that he must “Keep a watch continually” both on his 
“words and actions. . . . The best thing is to hit the exact course which the occasion demands.”74 This 
view of kairotic political action is most clearly expressed in his Panegyricus (ca. 380 BCE), an appeal to 
the Greek people to unite in expelling the Persian barbarians. He tells them that “the moment for action 
has not yet gone by” and that they “must not throw [kairos] away; for it is disgraceful to neglect a 
chance when it is present and regret it when it is past.”75  
The problem becomes determining these kairotic moments and the action that they require. For 
Isocrates, the answer is the exercise of phronesis, or prudence.76 The problem with the Sophists, he 
explains in his Against the Sophists, is not that they based their ethics on kairos, but that they had not 
developed the prudence necessary to utilize it.77 He accepts, as the Sophists had, that when it comes to 
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political affairs such as peace and war, “nothing . . . is in itself absolutely either good or bad, but rather 
it is the use we make of circumstances and opportunities which . . . determine the result.”78 His own 
educational program is outlined in his Antidosis, in which he writes that teachers are to instruct 
students to “combine in practice the particular things which they have learned, in order that they may 
grasp them more firmly and bring their theories into closer touch with the occasions for applying them. 
. . . [Those] who most apply their minds to them and are able to discern the consequences which for 
the most part grow out of them, will most often meet these occasions in the right way.”79 He concludes, 
however, that “no system of knowledge can possibly cover all these occasions, since in all cases they 
elude our science.”80 
However, one must still find a way to cultivate prudence — an understanding of how to act 
kairotically — without the use of universal laws or an absolute moral system. The answer rests in the 
nature of kairos as a segmented piece of time. As it is separable from the general progress of 
chronological time, it is possible to isolate two similar events — two kairotic moments — and compare 
them, drawing conclusions for present action. As Isocrates notes in his Panegyricus: “the deeds of the 
past are, indeed, an inheritance common to us all; but the ability to make proper use of them at the 
appropriate time . . . is the peculiar gift of the wise.”81 For Isocrates the “educated” are those “who 
manage well the circumstances which they encounter day by day, and who possess a judgment which is 
accurate in meeting occasions as they arise.”82 
This is precisely the approach applied by Plutarch in his Lives (ca. late first century–early 
second century), a method made explicit in the pseudo-Plutarchan Parallela minora: “since I have 
discovered that similar events [to those of the ancients] have happened in this modern era, I have 
singled out crises of Roman history; and, to parallel each ancient happening, I have subjoined a more 
modern instance.”83 Within the Lives themselves, kairos is a key element, determining the success or 
failure of the political figure in question.84 Plutarch makes clear that the character of the times has great 
effect on the fortunes of men, whose temperament should accord with the nature of the era in which 
they live. He gives the example of Cato, whose qualities, admirable though they were, did not accord 
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with his times: he “fared just as fruits do which make their appearance out of season,” as his qualities 
were “look[ed] upon . . . with delight and admiration,” but not used or appreciated;85 he “enjoyed great 
repute and fame, but was not suited to the needs of men because of the weight and grandeur of [his] 
virtue, which were out of all proportion to the immediate times”;86 he “acted as if he lived in Plato’s 
commonwealth, and not among the dregs of Romulus,” and so he was defeated in his bid for the 
consulship.87 
More often the character of the times offers a rare opportunity to assert one’s agency against 
the inevitable progress of linear time. By taking note of kairos, by being attentive to those crucial 
moments, an actor has a greater chance of success in an uncertain world. Caesar, for example, 
triumphed because he was a “man endowed by nature to make the best use of all the arts of war, and 
particularly of its crucial moments,” such as when he “took advantage of the favourable instant . . . and 
thereby . . . in a brief portion of one day he made himself master of three camps.”88 By contrast, 
Philopoemen “threw away his life . . . by hastening to attack Messene before occasion offered.”89 Being 
attentive to kairos may mean patiently enduring, as in the case of Agesilaus who waited “to find the 
fitting moment for [his] stratagem,” or acting speedily, as when Caesar took “advantage of the golden 
moment by showing amazing boldness and speed.”90 The lesson of Plutarch’s exempla is that “it is the 
critical moment which gives the scales their saving or their fatal inclination.”91 
This urge to act, whereby an actor can assert his agency against the press of chronos, often slips 
into a reverse relationship, where kairos forces action. Plutarch notes that Otho’s policies “were forced 
upon him by the situation” and that, for Manius, “the crisis forced action upon him.”92 Kairos is thus 
inseparable from a consideration of necessity. This connection in turn gives rise to a form of temporally 
based relativism. Plutarch writes that Titus’s “natural gift of leadership” led him to realize that he should 
not only rule “in accordance with the laws,” but must also, “when occasion required it,” know “how to 
dominate the laws for the common good.”93 Plutarch takes such lessons even further, echoing the 
Sophists, in his treatment of Agesilaus, in which he writes that “honourable action has its fitting time 
and season: nay, rather, it is the observance of [these] due bounds that constitutes an utter difference 
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between honourable and base actions.”94 Comparing Solon and Publicola, Plutarch notes that “we must 
view men’s actions in the light of the times which draw them forth,” for “the subtle statesman will 
handle each issue that arises in the most feasible manner, and often saves the whole by relinquishing a 
part, and by yielding small advantages secures greater ones.”95 This is even more explicitly expressed in 
the essay De Defectu Orculorum in his Moralia, where he notes that “every natural virtue produceth the 
effect to which it is ordained better or worse, according as its season is more or less proper.”96 
6. KAIROS AND OCCASIONE IN MACHIAVELLI 
Isocrates’s and Plutarch’s development of a political theory of kairotic action should be familiar to any 
reader of Machiavelli, for his own view of political action is consciously derived from this tradition of 
thought.97 Machiavelli does not employ the term kairos, but throughout the Discourses (1531) and The 
Prince (1532) he repeatedly uses the equivalent term occasione to denote the key moment that must be 
seized by a prince in order to demonstrate his virtù, underlining the importance of acting according to 
the needs of the moment, adopting a flexible moral stance, and understanding politics through 
comparative histories rather than universal principles.98 
Machiavelli draws attention to his use of this tradition in the first lines of the dedicatory epistle 
to Lorenzo de’ Medici, in which he borrows from Isocrates’s speech, Ad Nicoclem. Just as Isocrates had 
begun his speech by acknowledging that most courtiers bring “kings garments or brass or wrought gold 
or other valuable things of the kind,” Machiavelli tells de’ Medici that “they, that desire to ingratiate 
themselves with a Prince, commonly use to offer themselves to his view . . . cloth of gold, pretious 
stones, and such like ornaments.”99 Isocrates had argued that his advice was the “the noblest and most 
profitable gift and one most becoming me to give and you to receive.”100 Machiavelli likewise says that he 
has “found nothing in my whole Inventory, that I thinke better of, or more esteem” than his gift — The 
Prince.101 
The emphasis on occasione is expressed most clearly in the sixth chapter of The Prince. Like 
Plutarch, Machiavelli sets out examples of the “worthiest persons” to be imitated — in his case Moses, 
Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus. He emphasizes that these exemplary leaders were dependent on Fortune 
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only for the opportunity to demonstrate their virtù: “it will not appeare, that they had other help of 
fortune, than the occasion [occasione].”102 Machiavelli sets out a mutually supportive relationship 
between occasione and virtù; neither can be realized without the other: “without that occasion, the 
vertue of their mind had been extinguish’d; and without that vertue the occasion had been offer’d in 
vaine.”103 Occasione for Machiavelli, as for Isocrates and Plutarch, functions as a rare opportunity in 
chronological time, which only the truly prudent can recognize and take hold of: “their excellent vertue 
made the occasion be taken notice of,” which “made these men happy” and “their country . . . enobled, 
and exceedingly fortunate.”104 Similar sentiments are expressed in the Discourses, where Machiavelli, 
drawing from Isocrates, notes that Fortune favors those whose “judgement and spirit . . . knows how to 
make use of those occasions shee presents him.”105 
Just as with the Greek writers on kairos, necessity plays a strong role in Machiavelli’s political 
works. He writes in the Discourses that, because the times are always changing, “to many things that 
reason doth not perswade thee, necessity reminds thee,” and so he excuses acts, such as Brutus’s murder 
of his sons, on the grounds of necessity.106 As the ability to act according to virtú is based on occasione, 
there can be no praise nor blame for actions, and the moral valuation of such acts becomes neutral: all 
is dependent on “occasion . . . giving means to the one to behave himselfe vertuously, & quite bereaving 
the other of them.”107 
It is this acknowledgement of necessity that lies at the base of Machiavelli’s revolutionary 
treatment of the virtues in The Prince. Machiavelli writes that “it is necessary for a Prince, desiring to 
preserve himselfe, to be able to make use of that honestie, and to lay it aside again, as need shall 
require.”108 The prince must be willing to employ the virtues as necessity and opportunity dictate, “to 
have a mind so disposd as to turne and take the advantage of all winds and fortunes; and as formerly I 
said, not forsake the good; while he can, but to know how to make use of the evill upon necessity.” 109 
Recalling that, for the Sophists, kairos allowed for the redescription of good or bad, just or unjust, one 
might wonder how much of the famous redescription of the virtues that Machiavelli details in these 
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chapters are attributable to paradiastole, and how much to the theory of kairos that runs through 
them.110  
As with Isocrates, for Machiavelli prudence is the key skill in determining what action is 
kairotic.111 He defines this term in chapter 21: prudence, or “the principall point of judgement,” consists 
“in discerning between the qualities of inconvenients, and not taking the bad for the good.”112 Whereas 
for the Ciceronian humanists prudence was the virtue that brought universal precepts of the virtues 
down to earth, Machiavelli’s understanding of prudence is rooted in a focus on real-world 
circumstances.113 This means that, despite the definition he gives in chapter 21, it is almost impossible to 
define what exactly constitutes prudence, what activities or behavior define prudent action or the 
prudential person, for it varies with the times.114 
Thus Machiavelli, too, turns to a comparison of lives and events taken out of chronological time 
in order to attempt to demonstrate his version of kairotic prudence. Machiavelli’s work is built upon 
such comparisons, both between diverse cases in ancient times, and, like Plutarch, between the distant 
past and contemporary situations, based on “the resemblance these accidents have with the auncient.”115 
From this treatment, he makes clear that two different and morally opposed actions may both be 
justifiable, depending on circumstances.116 For example, from his comparison of Scipio and Hannibal in 
the Discourses, Machiavelli concludes that “it imports not much, in which of these two wayes [severity 
or mildness] a Commander proceeds, provided he hath so great worth in him, as may well season the 
one and the other.”117 Likewise in the case of cities, “whosoever then considers what is sayd, will neither 
in this blame Athens, nor commend Rome, but will accuse only the necessity, because of the diversity of 
accidents, which did arise.”118  
All these lessons — seizing opportunity, the force of necessity, moral flexibility, and the 
importance of comparative history — are applied in the final chapter of The Prince, in which 
Machiavelli presents his exhortation to free Italy from the barbarians, directly echoing Isocrates’s similar 
plea in his Panegyricus. The Prince thus begins and ends with a kairotically timed reference to 
Isocrates’s counsel. Machiavelli frames his advice in line with his comments in chapter 6, suggesting that 
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“the times might serve to honour a new Prince,” as “there were matter, that might minister occasion to 
a wise [prudente] and valorous [virtuoso] prince.”119 He returns to his discussion of occasione, 
connecting it with his treatment of necessity: for, just as it was necessary for the Jews to be enslaved in 
Egypt in order that Moses’s virtue might be shown, likewise “now wee are desirous to know the valour 
of the Italian spirit, it were necessary Italy should bee reduc’d to the same termes it is now in.”120 He 
explains that “that warre is just, that is necessary” — the necessity of the time is what dictates the 
ethical valuation of the action.121 Thus he appeals to his addressee, de’ Medici, to seize the opportunity 
presented and liberate Italy, based on the comparison with these kairotic exempla. In fact, de’ Medici has 
even more reason to be sure of his success than his predecessors because “every one of [these men] 
began upon lesse occasion” than the one currently before him: “Circumstances are now very favourable 
indeed, and the difficulties cannot be very great when the circumstances are propitious, if only your 
family will imitate the men I have proposed as exemplars.”122 Just as Isocrates had implored that “we 
must not throw [kairos] away,” Machiavelli concludes with the exhortation that “this occasion should not 
bee let passe.”123  
7. KAIROS IN THE LATER SIXTEENTH CENTURY 
Before moving on to the effects that a revival of kairotic thought had in the later decades of the 
sixteenth century, it is worth noting another tradition of kairos during this period: that of the visual 
representation of kairos present in the popular emblem genre of the time.124 For the ancient Greeks, 
kairos was not only a concept, but was also personified as a god, traditionally presented as a young 
athletic male with a short forelock. Usually represented in the nude, Kairos was always in motion, with 
wings at his heels, and sometimes on his shoulder. He often held a pair of scales and a razor, poised to 
strike off his forelock should he catch someone in the act of trying to seize it (fig. 1).125  
By the sixteenth century, the figure had become a woman, but very little else had changed. One 
of the most popular emblem books of the period was undoubtedly that of Andrea Alciato (1492–1550). 
His Emblematum libellus, first published in 1531, went through dozens of editions in a number of 
languages, always including the visual representation of the concept of occasio, almost exactly as the 
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Greeks had portrayed Kairos (fig. 2). The resemblance to the Greek figure, however, is not coincidental. 
Alciato’s description of the image begins by identifying it as “the work of Lysippus,” a Greek sculptor of 
the fourth century BCE and a contemporary of Plato and Isocrates. His famous image of Kairos bore an 
epigram by the poet Posidippus, which Alciato repeats in his caption of the emblem:  
Who are you? / I am the moment of seized opportunity that governs all. / Why do you stand on 
points? / I am always a leader. / Why do you have winged sandals on your feet? / The fickle 
breeze bears me in all directions. / Tell us, what is the reason for the sharp razor in your right 
hand? / This sign indicates that I am keener than any cutting edge. / Why is there a lock of hair 
on your brow? / So that I may be seized as I run towards you. / But come, tell us now, why ever 
is the back of your head bald? / So that if any person once lets me depart on my winged feet, I 
may not thereafter be caught by having my hair seized. It was for your sake, stranger, that the 
craftsman produced me with such art, and, so that I should warn all, it is an open portico that 
holds me.126 
The figure of Occasio develops and changes over the course of the various editions of Alciato. In 
the 1531 first edition, for instance, the figure is shown with many forelocks, and no wings upon her feet. 
By the 1534 Paris edition, she has her wings, and a repentant man, mourning the loss of her, is figured 
in the distance to her right (fig. 3). In the 1549 Lyon edition, she is represented as standing upon a 
turbulent sea, and the item below her feet has been clearly drawn as a wheel (fig. 4). The major 
exception is the 1621 edition published in Padua, in which the figure is male, stands upon a ball, not a 
wheel, and is positioned on dry land (fig. 5). The text varies only slightly from edition to edition. Similar 
images and text can be found in other emblem books, such as that of Guillaume La Perrière in 1544 (fig. 
6).  
Other emblems of the period emphasize the regret that will come to those who do not manage 
to seize occasion. For instance, Gilles Corrozet’s Hecatomgraphie of 1540 shows Occasio, still on a wheel 
but missing her razor, in a boat and accompanied by a second figure,  
Repentance, also sitting in her boat (fig. 7). The caption encourages the reader to grasp her quickly 
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when she comes, otherwise “Thou shalt make penance.”127 Perhaps the most striking example comes 
from Jean Jacques Boissard’s Emblemes latins of 1588, in which Occasio is shown in the clutches of a 
fierce Roman soldier (fig. 8). Repentance is once again figured, bearing her whip, but it would seem that 
it is not required, for the virile soldier appears to have Occasio well in hand. The caption reads: “Grasp 
[her], if ever occasio offers herself: she is bald from behind: and she glides on winged feet. Following 
behind, Metanoea [Repentance] pursues with whip brandished: and grievous punishment comes only to 
the slothful.”128  
The imagery of these Renaissance emblems, drawn from Greek mythology, was integrated with 
Machiavelli’s theory of kairotic political action by those writers who used Machiavelli’s ideas, and his 
language of occasion, in their works. It would be difficult to overemphasize how widespread this use of 
kairotic language in political thought was in the later sixteenth century, for one sees it employed by a 
variety of writers across Europe. The themes of seizing occasion, moral flexibility, necessity, and lessons 
learned from comparative history remain, tying this tradition to that of Machiavelli and his classical 
predecessors.129  
For instance, Bartolome Felippe (d. 1590) in his Counseller (1568) often borrows from 
Machiavelli’s Prince in his attempt to establish the proper skills of a political counselor. He notes that 
history is especially useful to a counselor, whose role requires knowledge of “fit opportunitie, with 
occasion proportionable,” as “counsellers for the most part, depend vpon the occasions and 
circumstances.”130 Recalling the classical tradition, Felippe adds that “in ancient times past, the Image of 
opportunitie was set vp in many places, that men might remember to let no occasion slip, which might 
be to their commoditie when opportunitie was offered . . . they painted her on a wheele, because she 
neuer standeth still, nor remaineth in one place, with wings on her feete, because she passeth away 
swiftly, her face couered with the haire of her forehead, because she lets none know her, but such as be 
verie attentiue to looke on her: with a raser in her hande, because shee cuts of their hope that take no 
heede of her but let her passe: with the hinder part of her head balde, because if she once be gone, no 
man can catch hold of her, and with a Maid that waits vpon her which is called Poenitentia, for 
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repentance doth accompanie them that cannot tell how to reape profit by occasion.”131 Like Machiavelli 
and the Sophists before him, Felippe emphasizes that the important question is not whether an action 
should or should not be done — whether it is utile or honestum — but rather when it should be done: 
“many things in mans life are mard, not for that they ought not to be doone, but because they be not 
doone in time and place.”132  
History, as it was for Machiavelli, was for Felippe and others like him the crucial source for this 
sort of knowledge.133 As Thomas Blundeville (ca. 1522–ca. 1606) writes in his True order and methode of 
wryting and reading hystories (1574), the historian gains “better knowledge of the opportunitie of 
affayres” of his own time by studying those whose “skill . . . causeth him to take occasion when it is 
offered, and to vse the meetest meanes to bring it to passe.”134 The reader of history learns that such an 
individual’s actions are “forced by outward occasion” and therefore “deserue neyther blame nor 
prayse.”135 Although his relationship with Machiavellian ideas was complex at best, here at least Francis 
Bacon (1561–1626) also agrees, detailing in his Aduancement of Learning (1605) the political “wisedome 
of pressiing a mans own fortune,” whereby a man may learn how “to frame the mind to be pliant and 
obedient to occasion.”136 The surest way to this is to follow Machiavelli’s method of the study of 
comparable histories, for “the fourme of writing which of al others is fittest for this variable argumente 
of Negotiation and occasions is which Machiauel chose wisely and aptly for Gouernmente: namely 
discourse vpon Histories and Examples.”137 
The most influential adoption of this language comes with the reason of state discourse toward 
the end of the sixteenth century.138 The greatest example of this new political vocabulary is from 
Giovanni Botero (ca. 1544–1617), whose Ragione di Stato was first published in 1589.139 Having set out 
his desire to correct a political discourse corrupted by Machiavellian “lack of conscience,” Botero 
establishes a reason of state which seeks to identify the “knowledge of the means by which such a 
dominion [a state] may be founded, preserved and extended.”140 Although he states that he wishes to 
reject Machiavelli’s influence, he does so by adopting Machiavellian language, including the relationship 
between virtù and occasione. He notes that “circumstances [occasione], the weakness of the enemy and 
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the deeds of others all play a considerable part in conquest,” and so it is only those with the virtù to 
counter and seize these occasions who “can hold what has been conquered.”141 In his lengthy discussion 
of the maxims of prudence that a prince must embrace, Botero writes that every ruler must “Learn to 
recognise the critical moment [occasioni] in war and affairs and to seize opportunities as they appear.”142 
He defines for the reader a “certain point of time when a fortunate combination of circumstances 
favours some piece of business, which both before and after that moment would be most difficult: this is 
opportunity, and it is of supreme importance.”143 He repeats these ideas in his I Prencipi of 1600 with 
direct reference to Plutarch’s Lives. In writing on Caesar, Botero notes that “Plutarch reporteth, That 
Caesar was indued by nature with a singular and extraordinary capacitie, in knowing how to take 
opportunities in all his actions and enterprises.”144 This “Oportunitie,” he goes on, echoing Plutarch once 
again, “is a most faithful friend to those, who duly & aduisedly go on in their proceedings; but an 
enemie vnto such as rashly & vnseasonably hasten their course, before their good houre be come.”145  
Botero’s friend, the Savoyard diplomat René de Lucinge (1554–ca. 1615), applied Botero’s theories 
to his De la naissance, durée et chute des états, published a year before Ragione, based upon an early 
draft of Botero’s work.146 Lucinge uses Botero’s theories to analyze the Ottoman Empire, inquiring after 
the means by which they have attained their greatness, how they maintain their empire, and the 
possibilities for overthrow by European powers. Lucinge makes clear that the Ottomans have employed 
a number of Machiavellian tactics in order to gain and retain the power they hold in the world. These 
practices, however, are not to be wholly condemned, for “there is not any vice so detestable, or crime so 
hainous that sometime carrieth not with it a shew and colour of good, and proueth not profitable to 
him which in due season performeth it,” a lesson driven home in the chapter demonstrating that the 
Turk, to establish his state “hath laide hold on occasion.”147 Lucinge is even more direct in his allusion to 
the classical tradition than Botero, combining his Machiavellian language with the imagery of the 
Renaissance emblems as Felippe had done: “The ancient Romans signified vnto vs by the picture of 
occasion (whom they adored as a goddesse, putting wings to her feete, supported with a bowle, behinde 
bald, and before hairie) that we must bee diligent to apprehend her when shee presenteth her-selfe, and 
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not in any case to let her slippe: considering that if she once escape vs, she leaueth vs nought but a 
vaine and vexing repentance.”148 There is “nothing more commendable,” Lucinge writes, “in all a mans 
actions” than the ability “to make the best vse of occasion.”149 Like Botero, Lucinge defines occasion, 
describing it as “an opportunity that the time more by accident then prouidence offereth vnto vs, for 
the well performing of what we haue in hand, and for the abstaining and well comming off from a 
dessine vnsesonably attempted.”150 It is not enough, however, simply to know the occasion; Lucinge 
makes clear that what sets the Turk apart is his “nimblenesse and celerity vpon his occasions,” for “that 
which most importeth, is to serue our turnes with it at an instant, when it presenteth it selfe, to guide 
out intentions to that perfection we aime at.”151 
It would be the work of a much larger study to demonstrate the multiple uses of this concept as 
it continued to be employed in the sixteenth and into the seventeenth centuries, applied to political 
actors such as Henry VII,152 the Earl of Leicester,153 Catherine de Medici,154 Louis XIII,155 and the Elector 
Palatine,156 as well as political events such as the courtship of Elizabeth I,157 the St. Bartholomew’s Day 
Massacre,158 and the English Civil War.159 What should be clear, however, is that by the end of the 
sixteenth century there was a prevalent political discourse derived from the Greek tradition of kairos, 
without which a full understanding of the political theory of the period — especially the shift toward a 
prudential and flexible political ethics, the emphasis on historical example, and the language of necessity 
and emergency — remains irrecoverable. To analyze and understand the political discourse of the 
Renaissance period, an understanding of kairos as both a theory of political speech and political action 
must be developed. Given the recent scholarship on kairos by historians and theorists of rhetoric, and 
the work done by historians of political thought on the transmission of classical ideas in Renaissance 
political writing, there is perhaps no better time to begin such important work.  
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1 See Carter; Enos; Haskins; Race; Usher; Walzer; and especially the contributions to Rhetoric and Kairos. 
This interest in kairos and rhetoric in the Renaissance has also spilled into the study of Shakespeare: see 
Beehler; Hunt; Waller.  
2 See Carolyn R. Miller’s foreword to Rhetoric and Kairos, xii, xiii. See also Kinneavy, 2002, 60; Ruffy, 
134.  
3 Kinneavy, 1986, 82. For Kinneavy’s place in the revival of interest in the concept of kairos, see 
Thompson, 73–88.  
4 See Baumlin.  
5 See Kahn; Skinner.  
6 See Guy; Rose.  
7 Although writing centuries after Isocrates, Plutarch was a leading figure in the Second Sophistic, which 
drew much of its thinking from the fourth century BCE. See Aalders, 10. For Plutarch’s knowledge of 
Sophistic works see Bons; Cooper; Mirhady; and for Plutarch’s particular interest in Isocrates, see Blois 
and Bons, 100.  
8 Onians, 345. Ibid., 348, suggests that this etymological background may also be behind the Latin 
opportunitas, formed of the root porta.  
9 Ibid., 343. 
10 Sophocles, 226 (Electra, 29–31); ibid., 225: “σὺ δὲ ὀξεῖαν ἀκοὴν τοῖς ἐμοῖς λόγοις διδούς, εἰ μή τι 
καιροῦ τυγχάνω, μεθάρμοσον.” For a treatment of kairos in Greek drama, see Race.  
11 Onians, 345. See the definitions of kairos given by Kinneavy, 1986, 80; Miller in Rhetoric and Kairos, 
xi–xiii. See also Haskins, 67.  
12 See John E. Smith.  
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13 See Kinneavy, 1986, 79. 
14 Thucydides, 1910, 305 (History of the Peloponnesian War, 8.67.1); ibid., 304: “ἐν τούτῷ καιρῷ οἱ περὶ 
τὸν Πείσανδρον.” 
15 See Kinneavy, 1986, 81–82; Carter, 101; Sipiora, 3; Beehler, 78–79.  
16 See Untersteiner, 119–20; Carter, 101; Sipiora, 4; Beehler, 79. 
17 Gorgias, 2004, 24 (Epitaphios, 6); ibid., 1964, 2:285–86: “προκρίνοντες, πολλὰ δὲ νόμου ἀκριβείας 
λόγων ὀρθότητα, τοῦτον νομίζοντες θειότατον καὶ κοινότατον νόμον, τὸ δέον ἐν τῶι δέοντι καὶ 
λέγειν καὶ σιγᾶν καὶ ποιεῖν [καὶ ἐᾶν].” Square brackets indicate text added by the editors of the 1964 
edition to complete the fragment. See Rostagni, 32.  
18 Dissoi Logoi, 111 (2.19); ibid., 112: “οὐδὲν ἦν πάντηι καλόν, / οὐδ' αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ ταὔτ' ἐποίησεν 
λαβών / ὁ καιρὸς αἰσχρὰ καὶ διαλλάξας καλά.” The quotation is probably taken from Euripides: see 
MacPhail, 102; Sipiora, 3–6.  
19 Rostagni, 33. 
20 Kinneavy, 2002, 62. See Haskins, 57.  
21 Translation and original quoted in Lane, 142: “τὴν γὰρ ὄντως οὖσαν βασιλικὴν οὐκ αὐτὴν δεῖ 
πράττειν ἀλλ᾽ ἄρχειν τῶν δυναμένων πράττειν, γιγνώσκουσαν τὴν ἀρχήν τε καὶ ὁρμὴν τῶν 
μεγίστων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγκαιρίας τε πέρι καὶ ἀκαιρίας.” 
22 Plato, 9:553–55 (Phaedrus, 272a); ibid., 552–54: “προσλαβόντι καιροὺς τοῦ πότε λεκτέον καὶ 
ἐπισχετέον, βραχυλογίας τε αὖ καὶ ἐλεινολογίας καὶ δεινώσεως.” 
23 Isocrates, 1928, 2:171 (Against the Sophists, 13); ibid., 2:170: “τῶν καιρῶν καὶ τοῦ πρεπόντως καὶ τοῦ 
καινῶς ἔχειν.” Note that Isocrates here marks a clear distinction between kairos and “propriety of 
style,” or  prepon, as two different elements of oratory. 
24 Isocrates, 1928, 1:29 (Ad Demonicum, 1.41); ibid., 1:28: “δύο . . . καιροὺς τοῦ λέγειν, ἢ περὶ ὧν οἶσθα 
σαφῶς, ἢ περὶ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν.” 
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25 Isocrates, 1928, 1:29; ibid., 1:28: “ἐν τούτοις γὰρ μόνοις ὁ λόγος τῆς σιγῆς κρείττων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς 
ἄλλοις ἄμεινον σιγᾶν ἢ λέγειν.” 
26 For the tradition of parrhesia, see Colclough.  
27 Plutarch, 1874, 10:187 (Praecepta gerendae reipublicae, 804a); ibid., 10:186: “ὀξεῖς γὰρ οἱ καιροὶ καὶ 
πολλὰ φέροντες ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις αἰφνίδια . . . Δημοσθένης ἠλαττοῦτο πολλῶν, ὥς φασι, παρὰ 
τὸν καιρὸν ἀναδυόμενος καὶ κατοκνῶν.” 
28 Plutarch, 1874, 1:187; ibid., 10:186: “ὁ δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν ἀνιστάμενος καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν 
καιρῶν ἐκπλήττει μάλιστα καὶ προσάγεται τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ μετατίθησιν.”  
29 Plutarch, 1919, 1:267 (Lycurgus, 20.2); ibid., 1:266: “Ὁ εἰδώς . . . λόγον καὶ καιρὸν οἶδεν.” 
30 Plutarch, 1874, 8:9 (Quaestiones Convivales, 1.1.1); ibid., 8:8: “Εἰ δεῖ φιλοσοφεῖν παρὰ πότον.” For a 
discussion of kairos in Plutarch’s Quaestiones Convivales, see Ruffy, 134–35. For dining as an important 
philosophical activity and a time for giving political counsel (as it is in Elyot), see Dillon, 37.  
31 Plutarch, 1919, 8:9 (Quaestiones Convivales, 1.1.1); ibid., 8:8: “οὐδὲ γὰρ Ἰσοκράτη τὸν σοφιστὴν 
ὑπομεῖναι δεομένων εἰπεῖν τι παρ᾽ οἶνον ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τοσοῦτον ‘ἐν οἷς μὲν ἐγὼ δεινός, οὐχ ὁ νῦν 
καιρός: ἐν οἷς δ᾽ ὁ νῦν καιρός, οὐκ ἐγὼ δεινός’.” 
32 Plutarch, 1919, 8:11; ibid., 8:10: “εἰ τοιαύτας ἔμελλε περαίνειν περιόδους, αἷς ἔμελλεν Χαρίτων 
ἀνάστατον γενέσθαι συμπόσιον . . . οὔτε τινὸς παιδιᾶς οὔτε τινὸς ἡδονῆς διαγωγὴν ἐχούσης 
ἀποστατεῖν εἰκὸς ἀλλὰ πᾶσι παρεῖναι τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸν καιρὸν ἐπιφέρουσαν.” 
33 Plutarch, 1919, 8:15; ibid., 8:14: “διηγήσεων εἶναί τι συμποτικὸν γένος . . . λόγος ἔχων καιρὸν 
ἁρμόζοντα τοῖς . . . πράγμασιν . . . φιλοσοφῶσι . . . διὰ τοῦ πιθανοῦ . . . τῶν ἀποδείξεων.” 
34 Plutarch, 1919, 8:245; ibid., 8:244: “ἐσκέφθαι καλῶς εἶχε τὸν φιλόσοφον περὶ . . . καιροῦ καὶ 
ὥρας.” 
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35 The importance and popularity of How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend in the Renaissance is the 
reason for using the 1603 translation of the text by Philemon Holland, drawing out the similarities in 
language between it and the sixteenth-century discussions of kairos that follow.  
36 Plutarch, 1603, 85; ibid., 1888, 1:121: “ἔοικεν . . . ἀεὶ παρέχειν ἱλαρὸν καὶ ἀνθηρὸν καὶ πρὸς μηδὲν 
ἀντιβαίνοντα μηδ᾽ ὑπεναντιούμενον ἑαυτόν.” 
37 Plutarch, 1603, 85; ibid., 1888, 1:121: “ἐν καιρῷ.”  
38 Plutarch, 1603, 105; ibid., 1888, 1:159: “καίτοι καθάπερ ἄλλῳ τινὶ φαρμάκῳ, καὶ τῷ 
παρρησιάζεσθαι μὴ τυχόντι καιροῦ τὸ λυπεῖν ἀχρήστως.” 
39 Plutarch, 1603, 108; ibid., 1888, 1:165: “ὁ δὲ καιρὸς ἐν παντὶ μὲν παρεθεὶς μεγάλα βλάπτει.” 
40 Plutarch, 1603, 110; ibid., 1888, 1:169: “οὓς δὲ παρέχουσιν αὐτοὶ πολλάκις οὐ χρὴ προΐεσθαι τὸν 
κηδόμενον φίλων ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι.”  
41 Plutarch, 1888, 1:169: “ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον εἰς παρρησίαν ἐστίν.” As Onians, 348, points out, there was 
an etymological connection between the Latin for door, porta, and opportunus, another common Latin 
translation for kairos.  
42 Plutarch, 1603, 111; ibid, 1888, 1:170: “καιρός ἐστι νουθεσίας . . . ᾯ χρῷτ´ ἂν ἐμμελῶς ὁ χαρίεις.” 
43 Plutarch, 1603, 108; ibid., 1888, 1:165: “Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐν οἴνῳ καὶ μέθῃ τὸ τοιοῦτο φυλακτέον, 
εὔδηλόν ἐστιν. Εὐδίᾳ γὰρ ἐπάγει νέφος ὁ κινῶν ἐν παιδιᾷ καὶ φιλοφροσύνῃ λόγον ὀφρῦν 
ἀνασπῶντα καὶ συνιστάντα τὸ πρόσωπον; ἔχει δὲ καὶ κίνδυνον ἡ ἀκαιρία μέγαν.”  
44 Plutarch, 1603, 110; ibid., 1888, 1:169: “ἐν τίσιν οὖν σφοδρὸν εἶναι δεῖ τὸν φίλον καὶ πότε τῷ τόνῳ 
χρῆσθαι τῆς παρρησίας.” 
45 Plutarch, 1888, 1:169: “ὅταν ἡδονῆς ἢ ὀργῆς ἢ ὕβρεως ἐπιλαβέσθαι φερομένης οἱ καιροὶ 
παρακαλῶσιν ἢ κολοῦσαι φιλαργυρίαν ἢ ἀπροσεξίαν ἀνασχεῖν ἀνόητον.” 
46 Ibid. 
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47 Elyot, 1533, 5. Importantly, in his Dictionary of 1538, sig. XXXv, Elyot defines decorum as “a 
semelynesse, or that which becommeth the person, hauynge respecte to his nature, degree, study, offyce, 
or professyon, be it in doinge or speakynge, a grace. sometyme it sygnifyeth honestie.” He does not 
connect decorum to a discussion of timeliness, thus making it even clearer that his discussion in Pasquil 
is about a completely different topic. Walzer also notes the connection between kairos and counsel in 
Pasquil, although he does not make mention of Elyot’s direct translation of the term, nor the Plutarchan 
tradition upon which he draws.  
48 Jardine, xxiii. 
49 Isocrates, 1533, 11 (Ad Nicoclem, 52): “χρὴ τοίνυν ἀφέμενον τῶν . . . καὶ μάλιστα μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν 
καιρῶν θεωρεῖν συμβουλεύοντας.” Elyot’s translation emphasizes the themes of kairos and the 
counselor far more strongly than the modern: Isocrates, 1928, 1:107 (Ad Nicoclem, 52): “You should, 
therefore, avoid what is in controversy and test men’s value in the light of what is generally agreed 
upon, if possible taking careful note of them when they present their views on particular situations.”  
50 Elyot, 1533, 4r–v. 
51 Ibid., 4v. 
52 Ibid., 5v–6r. 
53 Aeschylus, 2:216 (Libation Bearers, 583–85): “σιγᾶν θ’ ὅπου δεῖ καὶ λέγειν τὰ καίρια.”  Translation 
my own. Note that the form here is kairios, a variant of kairos. Note as well that the added temporal 
reference “spekyng in time” given by Elyot has no precedent in the original.  
54 Elyot, 1533, 5v–6r.  
55 Ibid., 6r. 





                                                                                                                                                             
60 Ibid., 7v–8r. 
61 Ibid., 8v–9r. 
62 Ibid., 12v. 
63 Ibid., 13r. See Dillon, 37, for the importance of dining and philosophic counsel.  
64 Ibid., 13v. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. For the translation of kairos as season, see Baumlin, 141–44. To season in English has its root in 
the temporal meaning of season, originally referring to allowing fruits, etc., to season — i.e., “to render 
(fruit) palatable by the influence of the seasons” — before picking them. Thus right time is 
etymologically linked to this sense of seasoning, and Elyot’s pun has even greater meaning. See OED, s.v. 
“season,” v. 1.a. 
67 Plutarch, 1603, 107. See Puttenham, 223: “And some things and speaches are decent or indecent in 
respect of the time they be spoken or done in . . . euery thing hath his season which is called 
Oportunitie, and the vnfitnesse or vndecency of the time is called Importunitie.” 
68 Elyot, 1533, 13v–14r. See Walzer, 11. 
69 Ibid., 15v. 
70 Ibid., 15v–16r. 
71 Ibid., 28v. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., 29r. 
74 Isocrates, 1928, 1:59 (Ad Nicoclem, 33); ibid., 1:58: “ἐπισκόπει τοὺς λόγους ἀεὶ τοὺς σαυτοῦ καὶ τὰς 
πράξεις . . . κράτιστον μὲν τῆς ἀκμῆς τῶν καιρῶν τυγχάνειν.” Once again, Elyot’s translation of this 
section on kairos varies from the modern, further emphasizing the role of counsel in guiding the king’s 
passions through a knowledge of kairos: Isocrates, 1550, Biv (Ad Nicoclem, 33): “Dooe thou nothyng in 
furie, sens other men knowe what time and occasion is meestest for the.” 
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75 Isocrates, 1928, 1:123 (Panegyricus, 5); ibid., 1:122: “οὐδ᾽ οἱ καιροί πω παρεληλύθασιν μάλιστα δ᾽ ὁ 
παρὼν καιρός, ὃν οὐκ ἀφετέον”; ibid, 1:223 (Panegyricus, 160), ibid., 1:222: “καὶ γὰρ αἰσχρὸν παρόντι 
μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι, παρελθόντος δ᾽ αὐτοῦ μεμνῆσθαι.” 
76 See Garver, 7.  
77 Sipiora, 9.  
78 Isocrates, 1928, 1:375 (Archidamus, 50); ibid., 1:375: “οὐδὲν . . . ἐστὶν ἀποτόμως οὔτε κακὸν οὔτ᾽ 
ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἂν χρήσηταί τις τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τοῖς καιροῖς, οὕτως . . . τὸ τέλος ἐκβαίνειν.” 
79 Isocrates, 1928, 2:291 (Antidosis, 184); ibid., 2:290: “καὶ συνείρειν καθ᾽ ἓν ἕκαστον ὧν ἔμαθον 
ἀναγκάζουσιν, ἵνα ταῦτα βεβαιότερον κατάσχωσι καὶ τῶν καιρῶν ἐγγυτέρω ταῖς δόξαις 
γένωνται. . . . οἱ δὲ μάλιστα προσέχοντες τὸν νοῦν καὶ δυνάμενοι θεωρεῖν τὸ συμβαῖνον ὡς ἐπὶ 
τὸ πολὺ πλειστάκις αὐτῶν τυγχάνουσι.” 
80 Isocrates, 1928, 2:291; ibid., 2:290: “τῷ μὲν γὰρ εἰδέναι περιλαβεῖν αὐτοὺς οὐχ οἷόν τ᾽ ἐστίν: ἐπὶ 
γὰρ ἁπάντων τῶν πραγμάτων διαφεύγουσι τὰς ἐπιστήμας.” 
81 Isocrates, 1928, 1:125 (Panegyricus, 9); ibid., 1:124: “αἱ μὲν γὰρ πράξεις αἱ προγεγενημέναι κοιναὶ 
πᾶσιν ἡμῖν κατελείφθησαν, τὸ δ᾽ ἐν καιρῷ ταύταις καταχρήσασθαι . . . τῶν εὖ φρονούντων ἴδιόν 
ἐστιν.” 
82 Isocrates, 1928, 2:393 (Panathenaicus, 30); ibid., 2:392: “τοὺς καλῶς χρωμένους τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς 
κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἑκάστην προσπίπτουσι, καὶ τὴν δόξαν ἐπιτυχῆ τῶν καιρῶν ἔχοντας.” For 
Isocrates and the kairotic tradition, see Sipiora, 1–11.  
83 [Pseudo-]Plutarch, 1874, 4:257 (Parallela minora); ibid., 4:256: “τυγχάνειν εὑρὼν δ᾽ ἐγὼ καὶ ἐν τοῖς 
νῦν χρόνοις γεγονότα ὅμοια, τὰ ἐν τοῖς Ῥωμαϊκοῖς καιροῖς συμβεβηκότα ἐξελεξάμην, καὶ 
ἑκάστῳ πράγματι ἀρχαίῳ νεωτέραν ὁμοίαν διήγησιν ὑπέταξα.” See Jacobs, 80–83, who points out 
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that Plutarch’s Lives were intended not as moral treatises, but as contributions to political philosophy. 
See also Shipley, 14, 195, 140, 374.  
84 Shipley, 21, 28, 77, 159, 165, 170, 209, 236, 281, 338.  
85 Plutarch, 1919, 8:151 (Phocion, 3.2–3); ibid., 8:150: “ἐμοὶ δὲ ταὐτὸ δοκεῖ παθεῖν τοῖς μὴ καθ᾽ ὥραν 
ἐκφανεῖσι καρποῖς; ὡς γὰρ ἐκείνους ἡδέως ὁρῶντες καὶ θαυμάζοντες.” See Jacobs, 70–71, 254, 281, 
314, 337.  
86 Plutarch, 1919, 8:151 (Phocion, 3.3–4); ibid., 8:150: “δόξαν μὲν εἶχε μεγάλην καὶ κλέος, οὐκ 
ἐνήρμοσε δὲ ταῖς χρείαις διὰ βάρος καὶ μέγεθος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀσύμμετρον τοῖς καθεστῶσι καιροῖς.” 
87 Plutarch, 1919, 8:151; ibid., 8:150: “ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ Πλάτωνος πολιτείᾳ καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῇ Ῥωμύλου 
πολιτευόμενον.” Montaigne, 593, cites this example in his discussion of “the times” in his essay On 
Vanitie: “Catoes vertue was vigorous, beyond the reason of the age he lived in: and for a man that 
entermedled with governing other men, destinated for the common service; it might be saide to have 
beene a justice, if not vnjust, at least vaine and out of season.” 
88 Plutarch, 1919, 7:505 (Caesar, 26.2); ibid., 7:504: “νυνὶ δὲ ὁ πᾶσι μὲν ἄριστα χρῆσθαι τοῖς πρὸς 
πόλεμον, μάλιστα δὲ καιρῷ πεφυκὼς”; ibid., 563 (Caesar, 53.2); ibid., 562: “ἐχρῆτο τῷ καιρῷ . . . 
ἡμέρας δὲ μιᾶς μέρει μικρῷ τριῶν στρατοπέδων ἐγκρατὴς γεγονὼς.” 
89 Plutarch, 1919, 10:389 (Comparison of Philopoemen and Titus, 1.3); ibid., 10:388: “ἐδόκει δὲ καὶ τὸν 
βίον . . . προέσθαι . . . μὴ κατὰ καιρὸν, ἀλλ᾽ ὀξύτερον τοῦ δέοντος εἰς Μεσσήνην ἐπειχθείς.” 
90 Plutarch, 1919, 5:107 (Agesilaus, 39.1); ibid., 5:106: “καὶ προσεῖχε τῷ καιρῷ τοῦ στρατηγήματος”; 
ibid., 7:521 (Caesar, 32.1); ibid., 7:520: “καὶ τάχει καιροῦ καταληπτέαν οὖσαν.” 
91 Plutarch, 1919, 2:521 (Lucullus, 16.6); ibid., 2:520: “ὁ καιρὸς . . . καί τήν σῴζουσαν καί τήν 
ἀναιροῦσαν ῥοπὴν προστίθησιν.”  
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92 Plutarch, 1919, 10:283 (Otho, 4.1); ibid., 10:282: “πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν ἡγοῦντο”; ibid., 9:429 (Pyrrhus, 
25.3): “καὶ τοῦ καιροῦ βοηθεῖν ἀναγκάζοντος.” 
93 Plutarch, 1919, 10:392 (Comparison of Philopoemen and Titus, 3.2); ibid., 10:391: “οὕτως ἡγεμονικὴν 
φύσιν ἔχων οὐ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν νόμων ἄρχειν ἠπίστατο πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον . . . 
ὅπου καιρὸς εἴη.” 
94 Plutarch, 1919, 5:101 (Agesilaus, 36.2); ibid., 5:100: “τοῦ γὰρ καλοῦ καιρὸν οἰκεῖον εἶναι καὶ ὥραν, 
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